The 'Humadivi' appeared to have had pieces of mooring ropes in both the ship's propeller and the bow thruster at the time of the allision on Oct 12, 2024, with the Borgharen weir in the Maas. Because the ship got stuck in the weir, shipping traffic was disrupted for a week and the water level on the canalised river dropped sharply. The investigation results of the allision were published today in the half-yearly overview of shipping accidents by the Dutch Safety Board: "When investigating the ship, a piece of mooring rope was found in both the propellers and the bow thruster. It is not clear when this mooring rope ended up in the propeller. The skipper did not notice that there was anything in the propellers prior to the allision with the weir; they seemed to be functioning normally." The final conclusion is: “It is therefore not possible to state with certainty what caused the ship to stop at the Noorder bridge and to drift to the buoy line. Video images showed that both the propulsion and the rudder were still in use just before.” Based on the results of the exploratory investigation, it was decided to stop the investigation. The 'Humadivi' was sailing from Bosscherveld towards Belgium with a cargo of sand and got stuck in the weir around 8:30 a.m. During the days before, there had been a lot of rain in the source area of the Maas, which meant that the water level and current were high for the time of year. At the Noorder bridge in Maastricht, the ship lost all speed. Subsequently, it turned around the bridge pillar as a result of the current, after which it sailed downstream towards the Juliana canal. However, at the Borgharen weir, the ship drifted towards the buoy line. In response, the crew attempted to reach the right bank next to the weir, but failed. The ship got stuck with its stern under the shipping opening of the weir, which was partially open at the time. As a result, the ship took on water and partially sank. One of the crew members was able to jump from the ship to the shore, the other crew member was safely taken off by the fire brigade. The salvage operation was difficult. It was not until Oct 18 that the ship was successfully pumped out, partially unloaded and pulled out from under the weir. Due to the almost week-long opening of the weir, the water level in the Maas had dropped considerably, which caused problems for nearby houseboats and harbours. After the ship was removed, the weir could be closed again. The water level then recovered, after which shipping could be resumed on Oct 19.The skipper has sailed on various tankers throughout the Netherlands for more than 12 years, including on the Maas. At the time of the allision, he had been sailing as skipper of the 'Humadivi' for 12 days. Before that, he had sailed with the ship for two weeks to get to know it. During that time, the same route was always covered. The day before the incident, the ship was already near the weir. The skipper then waited a day before leaving for Belgium, precisely because of the high water level. No indications were found of technical problems with the ship, which was inspected by a Dutch inspection agency in 2022.
News
STAR APOLLO
The 15 Indian crew members of the 'Star Apollo' have not been paid their salaries since the start of their contracts, lasting between four and eight months. In total, they are owed almost $80,000. The crew’s health is also becoming an issue, according to the International Transport Workers Federation. The vessel is currently docked at the Batamec Shipyard. ITF Inspector Mohammad Gulam Ansari, based in India, who is supporting the crew, said: “This is an Indian shipowner exploiting Indian seafarers, treating them like slaves. It’s yet another example of an owner refusing to take responsibility.” A video and image of the crew showrf them holding signs for help. Some of them include “when we ask for [our] salary, the company is threatening to block our COC (certificate of competency) and INDoS numbers”, “we don’t have proper food on board”, and calls to the ITF and the flag-state to resolve the situation. The owner of the vessel is the Vindhyawashini Offshore. The crew also used a sign to name not just the owner of the vessel but also the RPSL agent Avvic Ocean and the sourcing agent Great India Shipmanagement. Report with photo: https://splash247.com/abandoned-osv-crew-take-to-social-media-to-get-paid/
EAGLE S
Repair work on the subsea power line EstLink 2 that runs between Finland and Estonia and was damaged by the 'Eagle S', will start in May and is expected to return to commercial use on July 15, the Finnish power grid operator Fingrid said on April 16. A new cable was being installed on the seabed to replace the existing one over a distance of around one kilometer (0.62 miles). Implementing such extensive repair work has required detailed planning and necessitates a specially equipped vessel for the task. The work was being carried out by Nexans. After the incident, the Finnish authorities had seized the tanker, which was carrying Russian oil in the Baltic Sea, on suspicion it caused the outage of the undersea power cable as well as four internet lines.
DELPHINE
On April 16, 2025, at 3 p.m. a fire broke out on a vehicle deck of the 'Delphine', which had arrived from Immingham on April 15 and was moored at the Britannia Dock in the port of Zeebrugge. There were 110 electrical cars on board. Firefighters were attending in large contingents. Everyone on board was safely evacuated, there were no injuries. The captain of the ship remained on board to monitor the situation together with the fire brigade and emergency services. The fire was brought under control. Besides the fire brigade, four tugs were also deployed to fight the fire and cool down the ship's hull at starboard side. The internal fire fighting system was activated. By cutting off the oxygen supply with carbon dioxide, the fire was brought under control. The fire brigade was now looking at how to tackle the fire further. There was a risk that the fire might flare up again when the hatches are opened. It was also not yet clear how extensive the damage is. The hold is pitch black due to the large amount of smoke. There was a lot of smoke from the electric cars, which also made the extinguishing work more difficult.The fire had no major consequences for the operation of the rest of the port. The ships can still sail in and out, a ship that was at the LNG terminal had to wait because of the perimeter. Report with photo: https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2025/04/16/brand-cargoschip-zeebrugge/?fbclid=IwY2xjawJsukpleHRuA2FlbQIxMQABHkXXEm991fWYvFkGT82yNG3f2l3C3_KoYBSUpmK08mIF06cgsQM4eP6jIfko_aem_Ctw36kMssSfI_sSFUneKdQ https://focus-wtv.be/nieuws/brand-op-russisch-cargoschip-in-haven-zeebrugge-brandweer-nog-volop-aan-het-blussen
ALPHENAAR
On April 14, 2025, at 5.40 p.m. the 'ALphenaar', enroute from Rotterdam to Moerdijk with a cargo of containers, allided with the Algera Bridge, linking Krimpenerwaard and Capelleupon the IJssel, in Krimpen upon the IJssel. The damage was limited. One container on deck was dented, and the bridge construction suffered paint damage. The ship was able to moor again unassisted. The police have investigated and recorded a statement from the master, who, as he approached the bridge, began to doubt whether there would be enough clearance. ‘He then put the engine in full reverse, causing the bow to rise slightly, so that one container just hit the bridge. If the skipper had done nothing, he would have passed the bridge without any problems.’ The margins for the ship are small on the route to Alphen aan den Rijn. The 'Alphenaar' previously had alllided with the Algera Bridge in 2022. Traffic over the bridge between Krimpen and Capelle aan den IJssel was not affected by the accident, but shipping traffic was disrupted until the incident had been investigated. Report with photo: https://capelle.ijsselenlekstreek.nl/112/112/422272/binnenvaartschip-vaart-tegen-algerabrug-schade-valt-mee
MAERSK SHEKOU
An interim factfinding report on the allision of the' Maersk Shekou' at Fremantle on Aug 22, 2024, which was published on April 17, 2025, suggested that the vessel's helmsman and pilots were operating with different goals. The helmsman was actively steering to maintain a heading of 083 degrees, his last received helm order. Meanwhile, the pilots were trying to make an emergency turn to port, using full ahead thrust, assist tugs, bow thrusters and the port anchor, They unaware that their helmsman was applying starboard rudder to counteract them. Early on Aug 22, the 'Maersk ShekouÄ began heading inbound into Fremantle's harbour and took aboard two pilots. The primary pilot assigned for the transit was fatigued, so the backup pilot took charge during the master/pilot exchange. At about 06.10 a.m., as they entered the narrow entrance channel for the inner port, southwesterly winds picked up to about 40 knots on the starboard quarter. The ship began to swing to starboard. The pilot ordered the helmsman to steer 083; the helmsman correctly acknowledged the order at about 0613:45 a.m. This was the heading that the helmsman would try to maintain throughout the final minutes of the casualty sequence. At the time that the order was given, the helmsman had the rudder hard to port to counteract the effects of the strengthening wind. It wasn't enough to do the job, and the 'Maersk Shekou's heading was about four degrees off to starboard (087). The master suggested going to full ahead to increase steering forces, and at about 0614:34 a.m. the pilot agreed. There was a pier ahead, and they needed to turn to port fast in order to enter the harbor. With more power and a series of assist tug movements, the 'Maersk Shekou' began to swing back to port. As it swung back from 087 through 086, the helmsman moved to check the swing: he brought the helm to midships, then briefly to 33 degrees starboard. The vessel steadied up squarely on 083, the last ordered heading he had received, which was straight towards the pier. The pilot was unsure why the vessel had stopped swinging to port, and at 615:33 a.m. he told the secondary pilot that something was wrong. The secondary pilot had been on a phone conversation at the back of the bridge and had not been involved in the back-and-forth among the bridge team, but he interrupted the call and joined the decisionmaking process. Together, without checking in with the helmsman, they began working the assist tugs to try to turn Maersk Shekou to port. The rudder was amidships at this point, and the helmsman was maintaining a steady heading of 083.5 towards the moored tall ship 'Leeuwin II', now less than a ship length away, with the boxship full ahead and making seven knots. At 0615:54 a.m., the master put the bow thrusters full to port. At 0616:10 a.m., the secondary pilot ordered stop engines, then full astern, and the master ordered the crew to prepare to drop the port anchor. Beginning at 0616:21 a.m., as these emergency measures to turn to port were under way, the helmsman applied more starboard rudder to try to counteract the effort to turn to port. The rudder would be over to starboard as much as 29 degrees over the course of the next minute. At 0616:49 a.m., the engines reached full astern and the 'Maersk Shekou' began to slow. The anchor, tugs and bow thruster managed to start a swing to port, but not fast enough to avert an allision. At about 0618 a.m., the 'Maersk Shekou' hit the 'Leeuwin II' at about three knots. The 'Maersk Shekou' came to a full stop by about 0618:30 a.m., but continued to spin in place. The bow thrusters were still on full to port, and the ship was swinging to port at about 13 degrees per minute. At 0619:52 a.m., the master noted to the pilots that the bow thrusters were still running with full power to port, and the thrusters were shut down,but not quickly enough to prevent contact in the narrow confines of the harbour. 40 seconds later, a stack of containers on the 'Maersk Shekou's starboard quarter hit the roof of the Western Australia Maritime Museum. The ship's hull scraped along the wharf for a short distance, damaging the quayside and breaching a small section of the hull plating above the waterline. The ATSB continues its investigation and will release its full report, including its formal conclusions, when it has completed its review. Interim report: https://www.atsb.gov.au/sites/default/files/2025-04/MO-2024-001%20Interim%20report.pdf
TYCHO BRAHE
Passengers on the Øresund Line's ferry 'Aurora', which, together with the ferries 'Tycho Brahe' and 'Hamlet', operates a shuttle service between Helsingør and Helsingborg, were delayed on the morning of April17, 2025, because the ship could not enter the port of Helsingør, which was blocked by the 'Tycho Brahe' which had a technical issue. The technical problem meant that the 'Tycho Brahe's departure for Helsingborg was delayed by 30 minutes. Therefore, the 'Aurora' had to wait outside the harbor until the 'Tycho Brahe' had departed. After that, everything sailed as planned again.
WAN XIANG 699
On April 16, one of the 10 still missing crew members of the 'Hong Hai 16', which had capsized with 25 crew members, among them 13 Filipinos and 12 Chinese nationals on board, was found lifelessin the waters of Barangay Malaawan, bringing the death toll to two. At approximately 2:30 p.m., Coast Guard divers located and recovered the lifeless body of a 22-year-old Filipino crew member from the bridge area of the vessel. The body was turned over to authorities. Another body was recovered from the capsized ship the same day, bringing the total number of fatalities to three. The victim has not been identified. In the frame of the SAR operation and environmental response, the BRP 'Malabrigo (MRRV 4402)' has arrived at the site to assist with the ongoing operations. oreover, surface search efforts in the vicinity were conducted by Coast Guard Sub-Station Sablayan personnel, while the Special Operations Group held an underwater inspection and search operation. The vessel was found grounded on the seabed. During the underwater inspection, Special Operations Unit Southern Tagalog divers conducted a thorough survey of the amidships section of the wreck. Search efforts were immediately intensified to verify the possible presence of a survivor. Currently, nine crew members remained missing, comprising three Chinese nationals and six Filipinos. The capsized ship has been surrounded by 250 metres of oil spill booms as a precaution,, after a light oil sheen was observed, accompanied by a noticeable marine diesel odor. The vessel was carrying an estimated 2,000 liters of lube oil and 30 tons of automotive diesel oil. The ship’s owner and operator have been formally instructed by the PCG to remove the ship by hiring an accredited salvor. The PCG has also conducted an underwater survey and is currently assessing all potential risks, such as debris obstruction, poor visibility, adverse weather, and underwater cliffs, before proceeding with operations. Report with photo: https://www.philstar.com/nation/2025/04/17/2436737/owner-capsized-ship-occidental-mindoro-told-start-vessel-extraction
AVISO
At the quay in Kapelle-op-den-Bos, a pipe burst during cargo operations of the 'Aviso', carrying cement, causing a cloud of cement to be released on April 16, 2025, at around 9 a.m.The accident occurred at the Etex factory, formerly Eternit, on the Brussels-Scheldt-Maritime Canal. The fine cement dust spread around the ship and settled on various locations in the centre of the municipality. The center of Kapelle-op-den-Bos was also affected. Cement has also ended up on the ship itself. This must be removed too, but first and foremost everything was being done to prevent the cement from ending up in the water of the cana. In order to coordinate the emergency services, the municipal disaster plan was announced, which was lifted just before 2 p.m. There were no injuries, one person was taken to hospital for a check-up, but has since been released. Etex immediately took the necessary action, and the competent services were on site and are monitoring the situation. The remaining cement residue formed a fine layer and was mainly located at the West dike up to the Borms St. on the bridge and in the Karel Muyldermanslaan. The civil protection and fire brigade sprayed the cement on the public domain with water, so that it flowed into the public sewer. It esd requested to clean areas and materials on private property with water. Tesidents were asked to ensure that the cement does not come into contact with their skin or eyes. It was recommended to use appropriate protective equipment such as a face mask and gloves when spraying away, which were made available at the reception of the administrative centre. Anyone living in the area who has suffered any damage as a result of the incident or whose car was parked in the impacted streets can report this to Etex via, Bo.huberland@etexgroup.com, Silke.mons@etexgroup.com or 015 71 77 20. Reports with photos: https://www.hln.be/kapelle-op-den-bos/leidingbreuk-tijdens-lossen-vrachtschip-veroorzaakt-cementwolk-in-centrum-kapelle-op-den-bos~ab480572/ https://www.nieuwsblad.be/cnt/dmf20250416_94062442 https://www.kapelle-op-den-bos.be/incident-16-april-2025
LEEUWIN 2
An interim factfinding report on the allision of the' Maersk Shekou' at Fremantle on Aug 22, 2024, which was published on April 17, 2025, suggested that the vessel's helmsman and pilots were operating with different goals. The helmsman was actively steering to maintain a heading of 083 degrees, his last received helm order. Meanwhile, the pilots were trying to make an emergency turn to port, using full ahead thrust, assist tugs, bow thrusters and the port anchor, They unaware that their helmsman was applying starboard rudder to counteract them. Early on Aug 22, the 'Maersk ShekouÄ began heading inbound into Fremantle's harbour and took aboard two pilots. The primary pilot assigned for the transit was fatigued, so the backup pilot took charge during the master/pilot exchange. At about 06.10 a.m., as they entered the narrow entrance channel for the inner port, southwesterly winds picked up to about 40 knots on the starboard quarter. The ship began to swing to starboard. The pilot ordered the helmsman to steer 083; the helmsman correctly acknowledged the order at about 0613:45 a.m. This was the heading that the helmsman would try to maintain throughout the final minutes of the casualty sequence. At the time that the order was given, the helmsman had the rudder hard to port to counteract the effects of the strengthening wind. It wasn't enough to do the job, and the 'Maersk Shekou's heading was about four degrees off to starboard (087). The master suggested going to full ahead to increase steering forces, and at about 0614:34 a.m. the pilot agreed. There was a pier ahead, and they needed to turn to port fast in order to enter the harbor. With more power and a series of assist tug movements, the 'Maersk Shekou' began to swing back to port. As it swung back from 087 through 086, the helmsman moved to check the swing: he brought the helm to midships, then briefly to 33 degrees starboard. The vessel steadied up squarely on 083, the last ordered heading he had received, which was straight towards the pier. The pilot was unsure why the vessel had stopped swinging to port, and at 615:33 a.m. he told the secondary pilot that something was wrong. The secondary pilot had been on a phone conversation at the back of the bridge and had not been involved in the back-and-forth among the bridge team, but he interrupted the call and joined the decisionmaking process. Together, without checking in with the helmsman, they began working the assist tugs to try to turn Maersk Shekou to port. The rudder was amidships at this point, and the helmsman was maintaining a steady heading of 083.5 towards the moored tall ship 'Leeuwin II', now less than a ship length away, with the boxship full ahead and making seven knots. At 0615:54 a.m., the master put the bow thrusters full to port. At 0616:10 a.m., the secondary pilot ordered stop engines, then full astern, and the master ordered the crew to prepare to drop the port anchor. Beginning at 0616:21 a.m., as these emergency measures to turn to port were under way, the helmsman applied more starboard rudder to try to counteract the effort to turn to port. The rudder would be over to starboard as much as 29 degrees over the course of the next minute. At 0616:49 a.m., the engines reached full astern and the 'Maersk Shekou' began to slow. The anchor, tugs and bow thruster managed to start a swing to port, but not fast enough to avert an allision. At about 0618 a.m., the 'Maersk Shekou' hit the 'Leeuwin II' at about three knots. The 'Maersk Shekou' came to a full stop by about 0618:30 a.m., but continued to spin in place. The bow thrusters were still on full to port, and the ship was swinging to port at about 13 degrees per minute. At 0619:52 a.m., the master noted to the pilots that the bow thrusters were still running with full power to port, and the thrusters were shut down,but not quickly enough to prevent contact in the narrow confines of the harbour. 40 seconds later, a stack of containers on the 'Maersk Shekou's starboard quarter hit the roof of the Western Australia Maritime Museum. The ship's hull scraped along the wharf for a short distance, damaging the quayside and breaching a small section of the hull plating above the waterline. The ATSB continues its investigation and will release its full report, including its formal conclusions, when it has completed its review. Interim report: https://www.atsb.gov.au/sites/default/files/2025-04/MO-2024-001%20Interim%20report.pdf
ANACONDA
On April 16, 2025, at 1.15 a.m. the 'Anaconda', sailing on the Rhine en route from Frankfurt upon the Main to the Hanau Oil Tankking, was in collision with another tank barge near the Loreley at St. Goarshausen, loaded with 1400 tons gasoline, with an unloaded tank barge. After the ships hit sideways, the tanker got stuck on the right river embankment at river kilometre 553,600. There was a small water ingress, but the crew was able to patch the leak. The other ship could continue its voyage as it had remained undamaged, before the Rhine was barred for ship traffic between Bingen and St. Goar. The tanker could be refloated at 9.30 a.m. by the inland container ship 'Belicha' (MMSI: 244660037), en route from Antwerp to Ludwigshafen, and berthed in Bendorf, where it remained stationary as of April 17. The river was released for ship traffic after the successful salvage. Reports with photos: https://www.swr.de/swraktuell/rheinland-pfalz/koblenz/schiffsunfall-st-goarshausen-rhein-schifffahrt-gesperrt-100.html https://www.schuttevaer.nl/nieuws/actueel/2025/04/16/tanker-op-de-rijn-vaart-in-oever-na-aanvaring/
LOCH PORTAIN
On April 3, the lift of the 'Loch Portain' was out of order. As a consequence, the operator CalMac amended the Berneray-Leverburgh timetable until May 9. The amended timetable was allowing the crew to support passengers who required assistance, and met statutory requirements for crew hours of rest. Replacement parts for the repair have been ordered for the lift. CalMac issued an amended timetable valid until May 9: https://www.calmac.co.uk/en-gb/service-status/#/service-status/065?route=23
SYROS TRADER
On the morning of April 17, 2025 ,a fire broke out in the wiring of the 'Syros Trader', which was moored at the quay of the Westpoortweg in Amsterdam. Some smoke development was remarked at around 07:50, after which the fire brigade was alerted. They arrived on the scene with three fire engines and a cherry picker. The flames were able to be extinguished quickly. The crew members did not have to be evacuated and remained unscathed. The police attended with the patrol boat 'Kokmeeuw' (MMSI: 244110531).
WAN XIANG 699
The 'Hong Hai 16' ex 'Wan Xiang 699', started to tip over amid moderate sea conditions and capsized on April 15, at 5:20 p.m. off Barangay Malawaan in Rizal, Occidental Mindoro. The ship, carrying 7,400 cubic meters of sand, was preparing to depart for Manila with a cargo of sand at 4:30 p.m., when it suddenly tilted during the turning manoever and then toppled over with10 people on board, among them seven Filipinos and three Chinese nationals, who went missing. The Philippine Coast Guard Sub-Station in San Jose, the Special Operations Unit and the Marine Environmental Protection Enforcement Response Group in Southern Tagalog launched an SAR operation. The dredger was drifting bottom up, with possible personnel trapped inside the engine room. The sand carrier vessel, operated by the Keen Peak Corporation, had 25 crew members on board, composed of 13 Filipinos and 12 Chinese nationals. Six Filipinos and eight Chinese crew members survived the accident, while one Chinese national was declared dead on arrival at San Jose District Hospital. The Coast Guard was also coordinating with the Provincial Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office to prepare for potential environmental impacts, considering the deployment of oil booms. The PCG unit in Sablayan has dispatched an additional response team to support the operations. The PCG was checking underwater conditions and preparing for diving operations and cutting work. The SAR operation was going on on April 16. Reports with photo and video: https://www.abs-cbn.com/news/regions/2025/4/16/authorities-recover-another-body-from-ship-that-capsized-off-occidental-mindoro-1529 https://www.philstar.com/nation/2025/04/16/2436473/search-ongoing-7-filipinos-3-chinese-after-vessel-capsizes-occidental-mindoro https://www.bairdmaritime.com/security/incidents/accidents/one-dead-ten-missing-after-sand-carrier-capsizes-off-occidental-mindoro-philippines https://www.abs-cbn.com/news/regions/2025/4/16/authorities-recover-another-body-from-ship-that-capsized-off-occidental-mindoro-1529 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BwPlx-9ePnQ
COBRA
On Aprl 15, nearly 70 people, including families, colleagues of the fishermen and leaders of the Coronel area, boarded the Navy vessel "Janequeo" to travel to the area where the "Bruma" sank and bid farewell to the seven fishermen who have been missing since March 30. This followed the Navy's decision on April 14 to suspend the search for the seven fishermen after 17 days. They are the skipper José Luis Medel Sepúlveda, José Luis Medel González, his son Juan Jorge Muñoz Balladares, José Fernando Carrasco González, Julio Eduardo Gallardo Díaz, Carlos Hugo Escárate Ramírez and Jonathan Daniel Torres Saldaña. At the site, near the bay of Santa María Island, an ecumenical ceremony was being held aboard the "Janequeo" to bid farewell to the missing fishermen. to pay tribute of reverence and respect to them. The Biobío Prosecutor's Office is leading the investigation targeting the Blumar's "Cobra" and its crew as responsible for the accident. The Executive Branch has also filed a complaint for homicide. Meanwhile, the fishermen's families also filed a complaint for the same crime, in addition to the failure to provide assistance against the captain of the "Cobra". In response to the incident, the crew of the 'Cobra' publsihed a public statement, stated that they were "deeply saddened by the loss of our colleagues, because we are only now in a position to do so. We had not been able to express our pain before.” The crew members acknowledged that they felt stigmatized after the sinking of the 'Bruma', noting that “several of us cannot go out into the streets because we are being pointed at not only as protagonists of the accident, but also as responsible for this tragedy. For us, life is the most valuable thing. Not only ours, but everyone's, especially that of hardworking people like us, with whom we share a profession we love.” Along with this, they reiterated that "we are actively cooperating with the investigation and trust that the causes of this unfortunate accident will be clearly established." Therefore, "we ask for respect for ourselves and, above all, for our families" until the cause of the 'Bruma' sinking is determined.
EVENTIN
On April 17 at 7.30 a.m. UTC the 'Eventin' weighed anchor and was taken in tow by the tug 'Fairplay 83' (IMO: 9883637), and the 'Fairplay XVII' (IMO: 9808247), which both had been deployed from Swinoujscie, serving as steering tug, and shifted to the dangerous goods anchorage off Mukran. The convoy was escorted by the police launch 'Stoltera' (MMSI:211222830) during this manoever.
CG MUSTANG
The US Coast Guard has decommissioned the 'Mustang (WPB 1310)' during a ceremony in Seward on April 15, 2025. Capt. Christopher Culpepper, the commander of Coast Guard Sector Western Alaska & U.S. Arctic, presided over the ceremony honoring the nearly 40 years of service of the 'Mustang' and its crews. Commissioned on Aug 29, 1986, the 'Mustang' was the 10th Island-Class cutter to join the fleet. She has been stationed in Seward since it was commissioned, and its crews have since responded to over 200 SAR cases and completed over 2000 law enforcement sorties. The Coast Guard is replacing the aging Island-Class patrol boats with Sentinel-Class Fast Response Cutters (FRCs) which feature enhanced capability to meet service needs. There are currently four FRC's homeported in Alaska, with two more scheduled for delivery in the near future. Report with photo: https://www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/Article/4154295/coast-guard-cutter-mustang-decommissioned-after-nearly-40-years-of-service/
