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The 'David Duren (WPC 1156)' interdicted 19 migrants aboard a 25-foot cuddy cabin cruiser approximately 23 miles west of Oceanside, California, on April 22. At approximately 2:15 a.m., the 'David Duren’s boarding team intercepted a cabin cruiser, matching the description of a suspected human smuggling boat and discovered 18 adult males and one adult female, all claiming Mexican nationality. All passengers aboard the cuddy cabin stated they had not had food or water for two days and were medically evaluated. No major medical concerns were discovered during the evaluation, and the migrants were given water. The Coast Guard brought them to Oceanside where they were transferred to U.S. Border Patrol personnel. An urgent marine information broadcast has been issued by the Coast Guard, urging all mariners in the area to safely navigate around the unmanned and adrift cabin cruiser.

On April 21, 2025, the 7-meter-fishing boat 'TLA', with four people on board, suffered engine problems near Denia and requested towing assistance. The. CCS Valencia of Salvamento Marítimo mobilized the 'Salvamar Fénix', which took the wooden boat in tow and safely pulled it to the Denia Marina.

In response to the collapse of the Francis Scott Key Bridge in Baltimore after the allision of the 'Dali' on March 26, 2024,, the Maryland Transportation Authority (MDTA) has revealed that the William Preston Lane Jr. Memorial Bay Bridge (aka the Chesapeake Bay Bridge) does not meet current vessel collision risk standards, prompting the development of comprehensive safety measures in the frame of the of MDTA’s response to the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) interim accident report and urgent safety recommendations. The NTSB report found that the Key Bridge had a risk level nearly 30 times above the acceptable threshold for critical bridges. Despite the Bay Bridge’s compliance with its federal permit and annual inspections confirming safe conditions for over 30 years, MDTA voluntarily initiated a $160 million project in spring 2024 to evaluate bridge protection. The authority has already invested more than $175 million in bridge safety and security infrastructure over the past decade. The MDTA engaged Moffatt & Nichol (M&N), a leading firm in vessel allision design of bridges, to conduct the risk assessment. The firm’s staff includes the principal author of the AASHTO vessel allision requirements and previously taught Federal Highway Administration courses on vessel collision analysis. The assessment evaluated both the eastbound and westbound spans of the Bay Bridge, constructed in 1952 and 1973 respectively, using the most current AASHTO Bridge Design Specifications and Guide Specifications for an allision. In response, MDTA was developing both immediate and long-term risk reduction strategies. Short-term measures may include new communication protocols for vessel pilots, reduced vessel speeds, one-way transits, and enhanced traffic management. Long-term solutions could involve physical protection measures such as dolphins and pier fenders. The timing of these safety measures coincided with the MDTA’s ongoing study of potentially replacing the existing Bay Bridge spans. The authority has confirmed it will ensure current safety improvements don’t interfere with future replacement plans. The evaluation was part of a broader national safety initiative following the Key Bridge collapse. The NTSB identified 68 other bridges nationwide frequented by ocean-going vessels that were constructed before the 1991 AASHTO guidance and have not undergone recent vulnerability assessments. The MDTA will coordinate its risk reduction measures with the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, ensuring alignment with the interdisciplinary team approach recommended by the NTSB.

The 'Holi', with two crew members on board, was caught in a fish trap late on April 22, 205, off Barbate, and required assistance as it was unable to free itself. Divers of the installatin were mobilized on the early morning of April 23 and managed to free the yacht again. The SAR boat 'Salvamar Enif' was mobilized by Salvamento Marítimo to the scene and escorted the boat to the port of Barbate, one it was freed from the traps. Report with photo: https://x.com/salvamentogob/status/1914932546581696889

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has determined that debris in an engine’s lubrication oil system caused a serious engine failure and subsequent fire aboard the 'Ocean Navigator'. now sailing as 'Victory II', while docked in Portland, Maine, on Oct 18, 2023. When the vessel’s no. 2 auxiliary diesel generator engine sustained a mechanical failure, one crew member suffered serious injuries in the following engine room fire. The vessel, which had 128 passengers aboard at that time, sustained an estimated $2.4 million in damage. The Investigation findings revealed significant maintenance oversights. The crew had operated the engine for more than 5,000 hours without changing the lube oil, which was five times longer than the manufacturer’s recommended interval. The last complete lube oil change was performed in September 2022. Additionally, the oil filter elements, which should have been replaced after 1,000 hours of operation, had been in use for over 3,000 hours since their last replacement in May 2023. Post-incident inspection by third-party technicians uncovered extensive damage to critical engine components, including the crankshaft, main bearings, connecting rod bearings, and the no. 14 fuel injector. Further examination revealed abnormal wear on various bearings, showing signs of cavitation erosion and debris-related damage. The NTSB concluded that the engine failure resulted from debris accumulation in the engine’s lube oil system, attributing this to the crew’s failure to follow manufacturer-recommended maintenance intervals. The contaminated oil system led to catastrophic mechanical damage and ultimately caused the fire when atomized lube oil ignited after being released through the engine’s ruptured crankcase. Only the crew’s quick response prevented the situation from escalating. By promptly securing the engine room ventilation and fuel sources, they successfully contained the fire, which self-extinguished. The NTSB emphasized the importance of following manufacturer maintenance schedules. The report also highlighted the particular vulnerability of engine rooms to rapidly spreading fires due to multiple fuel sources and mechanical ventilation. It stressed the importance of crew familiarity with machinery, fuel oil, lube oil, and ventilation shutoff systems to effectively contain and suppress engine room fires. Full report: https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/MIR2513.pdf