General information

IMO:
8348472
MMSI:
316045069
Callsign:
VC4160
Width:
0.0 m
Length:
0.0 m
Deadweight:
Gross tonnage:
TEU:
Liquid Capacity:
Year of build:
Class:
AIS type:
Other Ship
Ship type:
Flag:
Canada
Builder:
Owner:
Operator:
Insurer:

Course/Position

Position:
Navigational status:
Undefined
Course:
204.4° / -128.0
Heading:
511.0° / -128.0
Speed:
Max speed:
Status:
moored
Location:
Toronto (Toronto Harbor)
Area:
Canada
Last seen:
2024-09-29
< 1 min ago
Source:
T-AIS
From:
Destination:
ETA:
Summer draft:
Current draft:
Last update:
1 min ago
Source:
T-AIS
Calculated ETA:

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Latest ports

Port
Arrival
Departure
Duration
2022-07-05
2024-09-26
814d 43m
2022-04-06
2022-06-14
69d 1h 57m
2021-11-01
2021-11-10
8d 13h 9m
Note: All times are in UTC

Latest Waypoints

Waypoints
Time
Direction
-
-
-

Latest news

Investigation report into allision published

Mon Aug 19 21:33:10 CEST 2024 Timsen

Speed and equipment failure contributed to the allision of the 'Sam McBride' with the Jack Layton docks on Aug 2022, according to investigators. The ship was sailing faster thanearlier in the day, perhaps influenced by the fact that the ferry was behind schedule, and only one of the vessel’s two propellers was turning as it approached the dock, according to a Transportation Safety Board investigation. The ferry was sailing at five knots as it approached the dock, which was two knots faster than its typical approach speed. There were more than 900 people on board that day, and 20 passengers were reported injured after losing their footing when the boat struck the dock with force. Emergency services responded to the occurrence and six of the injured passengers were taken to hospital. The investigation also found multiple deficiencies related to passenger safety management and emergency preparedness, among them: The TSB found no evidence that a safety drill including a large number of people representing the vessel’s maximum capacity had ever been conducted. An emergency drill in 2018 involved only 50 people acting as passengers. The city had also been operating the ferry with a crew of six instead of the minimum 13 recommended by Transport Canada in 2009. The investigation also found that the City of Toronto did not have written procedures addressing issues like safe approach speed for docking. Instead, the masters were left to operate in the way that they deemed appropriate. Without written procedures that defined safe practice for docking, decisions around travel or docking speed may have been influenced by operational pressures. The report took Transport Canada to task for failing to establish formal procedures to ensure that emergency procedures were in place to evacuate the vessel within 30 minutes of an abandon ship order. The report also found the city was not keeping an accurate account of the number of passengers getting on the ferry and that on some voyages, there were many more children on board than the number of child-sized life jackets. The TSB made three recommendations to Transport Canada: - Implement a requirement for crew members of all passenger vessels to complete appropriate training in passenger safety management - Implement a formal validation and approval process for passenger vessel evacuation procedures - Implement a process to validate that passenger vessels are keeping an accurate count of all passengers, including a separate count of children and infants, on all voyages.

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Daily average speed

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Distance travelled

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Ship master data