EVER GIVEN

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Costs of canal blockade were enormous

The costs of the Suez Canal blockade by the 'Ever Given' in 2021 were enormous, a study shows. A European research team, in collaboration with the University of Gothenburg, has analyzed that the accidentl cost A.P. Møller - Maersk 89 million dollars, highlighting the vulnerability of the global supply chains and the enormous costs that can arise as a result of a disruption. Of Maersk’s total losses of $89 million, the cost of maintaining container warehouses was the largest expense at $76 million. Ship-related and environmental costs accounted for the rest. The result of the study emphasizes the need for robust contingency plans and alternative transport routes to minimize future risks, according to Kevin Cullinane, professor at the School of Business, Economics and Law at the University of Gothenburg. The study’s findings are based on data from the Maersk’s fleet, which accounts for one third of all commercial vessels affected by the blockade of the canal. In total, 69 of the company’s ships were affected, either through rerouting via the Cape of Good Hope or due to delays in the Suez Canal. The longer voyages for the many ships and the waiting time increased Maersk’s fleet’s carbon emissions by 44,574 tonnes. In addition, the Suez Canal Authority lost $5.9 million due to lost traffic. “The research shows not only the significant economic risks in international logistics, but also the major impact that disruptions have on daily operations,” commented Hercules Haralambides, professor at Dalian Maritime University, Erasmus University Rotterdam and the Sorbonne Centre for Economics.

Maersk settled lawsuit against companies behind container ship for blocking Suez Canal

A.P. Moller-Maersk A/S has settled a Danish lawsuit against the companies behind the 'Ever Given' for blocking the Suez canal in 2021, forcing shipping lines to delay or divert vessels and causing global disruption of supply lines. The Copenhagen based company has withdrawn the case in Denmark, it was announced on Nov 29, 2023. The Danish shipping company declined to disclose the details of the settlement and wouldn’t identity the companies or individuals it had sued. The ship was operated by Evergreen Marine Corp. Maersk had sought 300 million kroner ($44 million) at Denmark’s Maritime and Commercial Court over losses caused by the event, online media ShippingWatch reported earlier this year. Evergreen denied it has liability for any damages to Maersk.

Report in grounding published by Panama Maritime Authority

The Panama Maritime Authority has submitted its accident investigation report on the grpunding of the'Ever Given' on March 23, 2021, in the Suez Canal, to the IMO which includes the conclusion that “the Captain has command of the ship at all times.” The ship was struck by strong winds and ended up wedged across the waterway with its bow and stern stuck in the canal banks, blocking all traffic until it could be freed. A critical time period in the incident occurred at about 07:38 HRS / LT. The report states: “The helmsman reported that the vessel had stopped turning to port and was starting to turn to starboard. At the time, the vessel was close to the port bank of the canal and the speed had increased to about 13 knots over the ground. The vessel then started to turn quickly to starboard, away from the port bank. The pilot initially ordered the rudder to port 20 degrees and then hard to port to stop the vessel from turning. Then the second pilot started communicates with the first pilot in local language. The first pilot reduced speed to half ahead and the vessel continued to turn to starboard. There was another communication between the two pilots in Arabic language and the main engine was increased to full ahead again. The vessel continued to turn starboard, towards the starboard canal bank. The pilot again ordered hard to port presumably to try to steady the heading but vessel continued turning to starboard side. The main engine revolutions were increased to Nav full ahead (53 RPM) but still the vessel was swinging heavily starboard. The vessel continued this swing and grounded at a speed of about 12 knots over the ground on the eastern bank of the canal at 07:41 HRS / LT, at location 30 01.059N / 032 34.810E, at 151 KM of Suez Canal. The investigators concluded that, according to Suez Canal regulations, the Captain has command of the ship at all times, and the pilot or pilots only fulfill an advisory role. The report goes on to say that the Pilots conducted the pilotage without requesting assistance from the Captain, who was more familiar with vessel maneuvering characteristics. Although the Captain did intervene in the orders given by the pilot, instructing the helmsman to keep the ship in the middle of the channel, they were not effective in preventing the grounding. According to the Suez Canal regulations, the permissible speed for ships is 8.64 knots, on average the Ever Given sailed at a speed higher than the permissible. The bridge team did not realize the vital importance of effective/efficient communication between the bridge crew and Pilots. Discussions between the Pilots in Arabic did not allow for the bridge team to assess potential hazards, conduct a risk assessment, implement corrective actions, or even request assistance from the VTMS. The VTMS, Pilots and Captain had not properly evaluated bad weather conditions, especially strong winds and reduced visibility, as a risk condition for a vessel with a large area exposed to the wind. The vessel did not implement preventive measures against the bad weather conditions by engaging tug assistance as indicated in the Suez Canal rules. The report describes recommended preventative measures for crews: 1. It is recommended that prior to any transit in the Suez Canal the Captain should gather deck/engine officers to demonstrate and explain proper marine practice to enhance teamwork, consensus and safety awareness. 2. It is recommended that in the familiarization meeting the pilot and the Captain establish the language in which communications will be carried out, preferably English which is the commonly accepted language for onboard communications. 3. It is recommended that the bridge team members are not over-confident about the Pilot's abilities and skills. In some situations, the Pilot may not be familiar with the particular design of the vessel and maneuvering characteristics, which could lead to undesirable circumstances. Therefore, the Captain must intervene if they consider it necessary, since according to the regulation of the Suez Canal, the role of the pilot is that of an adviser. 4. It is recommended that the bridge team should monitor the Pilot’s orders and ensure that all actions taken are timely, efficient, and effective. Additionally, the bridge team should try as much as possible and always take into consideration the pilot’s advice, to follow the passage plan, which has been properly designed, thorough checks, and can provide valuable information, such as abort points, safe transit speed, wheel over position, no go areas, contingency plans, etc. 5. It is recommended that vessels proceed with utmost attention when approaching a significant turn and give attention to safe speed. The vessel should be positioned at the center of the canal. This way, any potential bank effect will be reduced to a minimum, the vessel will be able to turn smoothly and there will be extra time to react in case of a navigational error. The rate of turn should never be greater than 10°/min.