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Final report into near grounding issued by ATSB

On May 15, 2025, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau has issued formal recommendations to three government agencies and a salvage operator with the release of its final report into the near grounding of the 'Portland Bay', now sailing as 'Scotland Bay', near Sydney in July 2022. The ship had been berthed at Port Kembla on July 3, when deteriorating adverse weather made it unsafe for it to remain in port, and the harbour master and ship’s master decided that the ship should sail and remain at sea until the weather improved. After leaving Port Kembla, the ship remained much closer to the coast than the 50 nautical miles prescribed by the ship’s procedures. Early on July 4, while drifting and slowly steaming just 12 miles from the coast, the main engine developed mechanical problems, and the ship began to drift toward the rocky coast, Delays with the ship’s master initially reporting the incident were then compounded when NSW authorities did not immediately pass on the information to the AMSA. It was only after several emergency broadcasts and a radio plea for assistance that a harbour tug was dispatched, which arrived nearly five hours after the ship was first disabled. By the time that tug, which did not have an operational towing winch or a suitable towline, arrived, Portland Bay’s master had made emergency use of both anchors one mile off the rocky shoreline of Royal National Park. The anchors reduced the ship’s progress towards the coast until two more harbour tugs arrived, about five hours after it was anchored. In the following hours, these tugs began towing the ship away from the coast, but some time later, the towline of one of the tugs failed and the 'Portland Bay' again began drifting towards the shore, now off Cronulla. The ship’s master was forced for a second time to deploy both anchors. Even with both anchors deployed and one tug connected, the ship did not hold its position and it continued to slowly move towards the coastline overnight. A key factor in the prolonged exposure of the ship and its crew to stranding, was the extensive delay in tasking the state’s nominated ocean-going emergency tug 'Svitzer Glenrock'. The Port Authority of NSW had assumed control to lead the response, with AMSA and NSW Maritime as support agencies. The initial request to AMSA for the 'Svitzer Glenrock' to be activated was made around midday on July 4 by the Port Authority, but was lost between the two agencies’ incident control rooms and was not followed up for many hours. It was not until after the towing attempt had failed and a further two requests were made that AMSA tasked the 'Svitzer Glenrock', almost 13 hours after the emergency began. Around 30 hours after the 'Portland Bay’s master had reported its disablement, the 'Svitzer Glenrock 'arrived after a voyage of 90 nautical miles from Newcastle in very rough weather. More than 48 hours after the emergency developed, the ship was towed into Port Botany for refuge and repairs by the ETV with harbour tugs. The ATSB’s investigation identified 8 safety issues associated with the emergency response, highlighting confusion and inefficient coordination between the multiple agencies involved. The report notes the NSW and Australian national plan for managing maritime emergencies are designed to provide the best available actions in managing risks along Australia’s e coastline. The AMSA and the Port Authority of NSW had not effectively implemented their respective procedures to comply with these plans, and NSW Maritime, the statutory agency responsible for ensuring the state was prepared to respond to this type of incident, had not effectively met this obligation. While the first responding tug crew have been praised for their efforts in what were very challenging weather and operational conditions, the three harbour tugs that were initially deployed to manage this emergency were not properly equipped, and ultimately were always going to be incapable of effectively towing the ship in the rough, open seas even though at 15,500 tonnes, it was less than half the weight had it been fully laden with cargo. Several safety actions were taken by AMSA and the ship’s management company, which have been detailed in the final report. Eight safety issues identified by the investigation have not yet been addressed to the ATSB Commission’s satisfaction, which is why we have made safety recommendations to four organisations, calling for additional action to be taken. To AMSA, the ATSB has recommended the agency takes further action, or completes proposed safety action, to address the following (summarised) inter-related safety issues: - AMSA’s procedures supporting the National Plan had not been effectively implemented. - Inadequate coordination on AMSA’s part resulted from not having the required understanding of its central role in the emergency due to direct control of national emergency towage assets and powers of intervention. - AMSA had not effectively met its obligation as the manager of the National Plan to ensure it was adequately prepared to respond to such incidents. - AMSA’s process to issue directions under powers of intervention was inefficient with excessive time taken to issue them to allow the ship refuge in port. The ATSB has recommended the Port Authority of NSW takes action to address the following (summarised) safety issues: - The Port Authority’s procedures to comply with the NSW Plan and its operating licence were not effectively implemented. - The Port Authority’s response coordination was impacted by an incorrect understanding of its responsibilities under its operating licence and relevant state plans. To NSW Maritime, the ATSB has recommended the agency take action to address the finding that: - NSW Maritime had not effectively met its legislative obligation to ensure that New South Wales was prepared to respond to an incident in accordance with the state’s plan. To United Salvage, the ATSB has recommended the organisation: - takes safety action to ensure its capabilities and limitations to provide professional salvage services are made clearly known to the master, owners and managers of the ship to be salved under a salvage agreement. The ATSB will continue to monitor for action taken by the responsible organisations in addressing these recommendations. Full report: https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2022/mair/mo-2022-006

Timeline into close call published

The master of the 'Portland Bay' took almost an hour to notify authorities its engine had failed before the vessel moved dangerously close to hitting the NSW coast after an engine failure on July 4, 2022, at 6 a.m. amid heavy seas. The authorities in Port Kembla were only informed at 6.58 a.m. - hours after smoke was first detected onboard. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau has released a timeline of events ahead of a safety analysis and report into the incident. The ship was instructed by Vessel Traffic Services to leave Port Kembla on July 3 as rough conditions risked damage to the wharf and ship. Early on July 4 the main engine was cut, but was restarted at full speed ahead after the ship surged and rolled heavily in rough seas. At 4.50 a.m. two fire detectors in the engine room went off before smoke was identified and the engine speed was reduced at about 5 a.m. The chief mate began slowing down the main engine and minutes later, the engine setting was reduced further to dead slow ahead. The master notified the ship's managers of the main engine failure and the vessel's situation at about 6 a.m. but did not alert Vessel Traffic Services. At 7 a.m. the master broadcast an urgency message when the carrier was 11 miles south of Botany Bay and 5.8 miles from the nearest coastline. Marine Rescue NSW in Port Kembla acknowledged this urgency message but the Australian Maritime Safety Authority was not notified by traffic services until 7.44 a.m. when the ship was at risk of grounding on the coast in 90 minutes. About 8 a.m., the authority started planning for a possible evacuation of Portland Bay's crew in the event that the ship grounded on the rocky coastline, endangering the crew. 15 minutes later, Portland Bay's master broadcast distress alerts on maritime satellite communication systems and marine radio frequencies. At 8.30 a.m. the master sounded the ship's general emergency alarm and gathered the crew as he contemplated abandoning the ship. Three rescue helicopters arrived at the ship at 9 a.m. but had to abandon a plan to winch the crew to safety due to the ship's instability. When the ship was about one nautical mile from the nearest coastline and in water depths of about 45 meters, the master was able to anchor it. Tug boats punched through dangerous seas to rescue the ship's crew. The bureau's final report will assess several factors which caused the accident including emergency response aboard the ship and the response by state and national authorities. Report with photo: https://www.theadvocate.com.au/story/8139213/stricken-ship-late-to-alert-authorities-in-close-call/?src=rss

Generators run with excessive sulfur

Because the generators of the "Portland Bay" which berthed in the Elbe Port Brunsbüttel on Oct 14, 2012, were run on diesel fuel with excessive sulfur, the Filipino captain had to pay a guarantee deposit of 1780 Euro. The ship had carried copper concentrate from Brazil. During a routine check of the water police Brunsbüttel it was noticed that there was no low-sulfur diesel fuel on board the ship. The fuel on board had a sulfur content from 0.18 to 0.32 percent. The captain now was expecting misdemeanor proceedings.