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BSU investigation report into allision with wind turbine published

On Jan 30, 2025, the BSU has issued its investigation report into the allision of the 'Petra L' , actually sailing as 'Maria G', with an offshore wind turbine in the Gode Wind 1 wind farm, en route from Szczecin to Merksem on April 24, 2023, at 8.04 p.m., while heading for the Terschelling-German Bight traffic separation scheme (TSS). The ship was sailing at a speed of about nine knots and was heavily damaged. The bow was torn open and pushed in on the starboard side, including below the waterline, which led to water ingress. Since the ship remained buoyant and the engine was still running, the master decided to sail 70 nautical miles to Emden and initially sailed back to the TSS. The ship reached the port of Emden on April 25 at 08.40 a.m. The BSU was informed about the incident at midday. Two investigators surveyed the ship the following day and spoke with the parties involved. In the opinion of the BSU, the allision could have been prevented if a proper lookout had been maintained at all times in accordance with paragraphs 24.1 and 32 of Section A-VIII/2 STCW Code. The allision occurred when the master, who was on navigational watch as scheduled, mistakenly took the wrong dietary supplement due to chronic fatigue and fell asleep. The BNWAS did not ensure that the only lookout, i.e., the officer on watch (the master), was sufficiently alert. There was no additional lookout alongside the officer on watch or any other alarm system with which the danger could have been detected and the allision prevented. In addition to the master, there was only one chief mate, meaning the two individuals had to share watchkeeping duties around the clock, with the master also required at all times to perform additional duties. It must be noted that one master and one chief mate are not sufficient to ensure the safe operation of a vessel – this applies in particular to ships such as the PETRA L, which are equipped with only an autopilot, radar (ARPA), AIS, and BNWAS to support navigational watchkeeping duties. The current 500 m safety zone around an offshore installation seems to be outdated. Given the size and speed of modern ships, significantly longer reaction times are now needed. It raises the question as to why monitoring by the wind farm operator should be limited to the safety zone. Moreover, to detect every vessel in the vicinity of a wind farm installation, radar monitoring should not be dispensed with. Of course, to achieve the best possible result, this should be integrated with AIS and ECDIS. Vessel traffic service centres The sudden absence of the NvD at the Wilhelmshaven vessel traffic service centre was to be compensated for by the NvD of the neighbouring VTS assuming responsibility. However, the resulting area being monitored is so extensive that it cannot be managed by just one VTS. This accident clearly demonstrates the need for a faster and more immediate standby system to address the sudden absence of an NvD. The remaining manning (one NvD and three nautical assistants) was evidently not sufficient for the unusual course of the 'Petra L' to be noticed within 50 minutes of her leaving the TSS. It should also be mentioned that neither the NvD of Vessel Traffic Service Wilhelmshaven nor later the NvD of VTS Emden inquired why the PETRA L wanted to go to Emden at such short notice. The ship’s plight was only recognised in the lock at Emden. On the other hand, the transmission of an (automated) distress call (mayday) was at the master’s discretion. The wind farm operator’s internal investigation revealed that alarms in the SOMS were muted when the allision happened, as the numerous alarms were considered disruptive. The BSU believes that an average of six alarms per hour should not overwhelm a sea area monitoring coordinator. Accordingly, this should be changed. Another issue were software updates. Associated training should be provided to all users promptly so as to avoid operating errors and/or misinterpretations. The BSU makes the following recommendations to the BMDV: - It should work toward effecting a revision of Resolution A.1047(27). All ships operating a multi-shift system should be required to have a sufficient number of deck officers on board so that the master is not forced to keep regular watches. In accordance with the Maritime Labour Convention, each ship should have a cook, and the minimum safe manning document should specify the qualifications required. Further qualification requirements, such as in the context of maritime safety, security, etc., should be clearly specified in the minimum safe manning document. - Prescribe the use of radar for maritime surveillance and amend Decree WS 23/528.2/2-2-2 accordingly. The BSU makes the following recommendations to the ship operator: - Reapply for the PETRA L’s minimum safe manning document in accordance with the conclusions regarding manning. - Deploy at least two deck officers on its ships in addition to the master. The BSU makes the following recommendations to the flag State Antigua and Barbuda: - Consider the conclusions regarding manning when issuing minimum safe manning documents. - Amend accordingly comparable minimum safe manning documents already issued, taking into account the necessary adjustments. The BSU makes the following recommendations to the GDWS: - Ensure that standby personnel are available for its vessel traffic service centres. - Stipulate that wind farm operators must ensure that monitoring is carried out in a safety zone beyond the 500 m radius so that they can take appropriate action in good time to prevent an allision. - Allow wind farm operators to contact vessels within the safety zone directly to save time in dangerous situations. - Raise awareness among its NvDs of the need to inquire about the reasoning behind reported deviations from planned routes. - Continue to monitor the transcription of conversations on VHF so as to enable vessel traffic service centres to make use of the technical option of reading conversations in real time. Full report: https://safety4sea.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/BSU-Collistion-of-vessel-with-wind-turbine-2025_01.pdf

Collision with a wind turbine

Collision with a wind turbine German Report: https://www.ndr.de/nachrichten/niedersachsen/oldenburg_ostfriesland/Riesiges-Loch-im-Rumpf-Schiff-ist-mit-Windkraftanlage-kollidiert,schiff1390.html

Disabled cargo ship blocked fairway

In the early morning of July 24, 2016, the Hunte had to be blocked for ship traffic after the "Lisa D" got caught by strong currents while sailing with reduced Speed and was pushed perpendicular to the fairway in dense fog off the Hunte-Barrier. The ship was pushed against two pilings and unable to proceed with pwn power. Only when the current changed with the tide, the 63-year old Lithanian master was able to regain control and continue the voyage from Szczecin to Elsfleth with own power. German report with photo: http://www.presseportal.de/blaulicht/pm/119277/3386239